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F A C U L T Y

V I E W S

Shelby County v. Holder: Why Section 2 Matters
By Ellen D. Katz
Editor’s Note: Professor Ellen D. Katz writes and teaches about
election law, civil rights and remedies, and equal protection.
She and the Voting Rights Initiative at Michigan Law filed a
brief as amicus curiae in Shelby County v. Holder, on which
the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments February 27.
Here, she examines why Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
bears consideration in the case, which involves a challenge
to Section 5 of the act.

The Justices are nevertheless likely to view a comparative
inquiry as relevant to the question presented in Shelby County,
and with good cause. Congress’s decision to reauthorize the
regional provisions of the VRA rests on its belief that the
statute remains necessary, and a comparison of covered and
non-covered jurisdictions provides one lens through which to
assess that decision. Thus, although Shelby County does not
require a comparative inquiry, it invites one.

Four years ago, when the Supreme Court last considered the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA),
Justice Kennedy questioned why “[t]he sovereignty of Alabama
is less than the sovereign dignity of Michigan,” and why the
government of one is “to be trusted less” than the government
of the other. Should the Justices now strike down the statute,
as many think they are poised to do, the reason why will likely
be their belief that places like Alabama are no longer any
different from places like Michigan—or, better yet, Ohio,
where Section 5 is wholly inapplicable. Voters may confront
difficulties in Alabama, the Justices would posit, but these
difficulties appear no worse than those faced by voters in
those states left unregulated by Section 5. Therefore,
Section 5 must be invalid. Q.E.D.

Such an inquiry, however, must take seriously Section 5’s status
as an operational statute. The Court, to be sure, has made clear
that Congress now needs evidence of rampant unconstitutional
conduct in order to adopt new civil rights legislation, but Section
5 is not new. If the problems that prompted Congress to enact
the VRA in the first instance persisted wholly unchanged today,
Section 5 should be discarded as ineffective. To require such
evidence as a prerequisite to reauthorization (as opposed to
initial enactment), therefore makes little sense. It would allow
Section 5 to continue only if the statute had been a failure.

Sounds plausible perhaps, but take a closer look. As an initial
matter, it is not at all clear that the Court needs to compare
covered and non-covered jurisdictions in order to assess the
constitutionality of the VRA. The issue presented in Shelby
County v. Holder is not whether the Justices think Alabama is
worse than Ohio, or even whether Congress might permissibly
conclude that it is. Instead, Shelby County presents a different
question: whether Congress has the power to extend a remedial
regime that everyone agrees it lawfully adopted based on its
conclusion that the regime continues to do critical work in the
places where it operates. That conclusion should not be suspect,
much less invalid, simply because problems have since
developed in other jurisdictions that Congress might also
appropriately regulate.

No one thinks the statute has been a failure. What is disputed is
the scope of its success. Critics of the VRA claim that conditions
have improved in places like Alabama because the problems
Section 5 targets have been solved, and decidedly not because
Section 5 actively shapes public conduct in covered jurisdictions
in significant and productive ways. In other words, those who
insist that similarities between Alabama and Ohio render
Section 5 invalid discount and often disregard Section 5’s
blocking and deterrent effects.
There is, however, extensive evidence showing that Section
5 significantly shapes governance decisions in covered
jurisdictions. Hundreds of proposed changes to election laws
have been blocked by the Department of Justice; hundreds
more have been withdrawn or altered in the course of Section 5
review; and many more changes were never proposed because
local officials knew they would not be Section 5 compliant.
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And yet, places like Alabama do not look better than places
left unregulated by the statute. A study I did with students here
at the University of Michigan Law School suggests that voting
problems remain more prevalent in places covered by the Act
than elsewhere. Our examination of claims brought under the
core permanent provision of the VRA—known as “Section 2”—
shows that plaintiffs have been more likely to succeed and
succeeded more often in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, and that this disparity is even more pronounced
when Section 2 challenges were brought against local voting
requirements and procedures. We found, moreover, that courts
hearing Section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions were more
likely to find certain conditions linked to voting discrimination,
including things like intentional discrimination, extreme racial
polarization in voting, and a lack of success by minority
candidates.
The court of appeals in Shelby County called the regional
disparity our study identified “particularly dramatic” in light of
Section 5’s blocking and deterrent effects. Section 2 and Section
5, of course, are not coextensive, but a large number of electoral
practices run afoul of both provisions. Where they do, Section 5’s
preclearance requirement typically blocks implementation of the
offending practice and eliminates the need for plaintiffs to
challenge it under Section 2. Thus, although the precise effect
of Section 5 cannot be quantified, the court of appeals was
surely correct that it “reduc[es] the need for section 2 litigation
in covered jurisdictions.”

Our Section 2 results also suggest that intentional discrimination
may be more pervasive in covered jurisdictions than a cursory
comparison of covered and non-covered jurisdictions suggests.
As the court of appeals observed, Section 2’s results tests
“requires consideration of factors very similar to those used to
establish discriminatory intent-based circumstantial evidence.”
Because courts need not find intent to find a Section 2 violation
and have an obligation to avoid resolving constitutional
Left and above: Large crowds gather outside the Supreme
Court on the day of the Shelby County arguments.

questions when they are able, some adjudicated Section 2
violations capture conduct that is also unconstitutional even
though the decisions do not explicitly say so.
Our Section 2 study did not examine claims that were settled
or decided without a published decision and accordingly
addressed only a portion of the Section 2 claims filed or decided
since 1982. And yet, as the court of appeals found, available
data suggest that a fuller accounting of Section 2 litigation
would reveal an even greater disparity in successful plaintiff
outcomes between covered and non-covered jurisdictions.
Where, moreover, the disparity is less pronounced (as, for
instance, it has become over time), the Section 2 data still
attest to Section 5’s continued importance. Even a rough
equivalence in outcomes is significant, given Section 5’s
blocking and deterrent effects and the disparities in
population and relative numbers of political subdivisions.
The question whether places like Alabama are really any
different from places like Ohio is sure to occupy the Court’s
attention in Shelby County. The answer should be pursued
with a clear understanding of what a comparison of covered
and non-covered jurisdictions can be expected to yield. Section 5
is an operational statute with significant blocking and deterrent
effects. Conditions in covered jurisdictions cannot be examined
meaningfully or compared responsibly to those in non-covered
regions unless these operational effects are considered. It is
willful ignorance to do otherwise.
This article originally appeared on SCOTUSblog (Feb. 15, 2013),
www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-whysection-2-matters/.
Ellen D. Katz is the Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law. She writes
and teaches about election law, civil rights and remedies, and
equal protection. Her scholarship addresses questions of minority
representation, political equality, and the role of institutions in
crafting and implementing anti-discrimination laws. Her research
and scholarship about the Voting Rights Act is highly regarded
and frequently cited.
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But even with this “reduc[ed]” need, Section 2 plaintiffs
have been more likely to succeed and, in fact, have succeeded
more often in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered ones.
Making the disparity all the more dramatic is the fact that
covered jurisdictions are home to less than one quarter of the
population, and, by a lopsided margin, contain far few local
governmental units.
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Given these blocking and deterrent effects, we should expect
to find fewer instances of discriminatory practices in places
subject to Section 5 if, as critics of the VRA contend, places like
Alabama are truly no different from places like Ohio. Covered
jurisdictions should look markedly better than jurisdictions not
subject to Section 5 insofar as public officials nationwide have
comparable inclinations to engage in discriminatory practices
and confront comparable opportunities calling for such
judgments.
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